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ABSTRACT 
The concept Literature is acomplex one. Relevance Theory can describe in a cognitive and 
scientific way its communicative operations that do not distinguish it from other types of 
discourse in a fundamental way. What is urgently needed is a cognitive scientific approach 
to the artistic aspects of tiiis concept. In this paper, a possible way is offered in outline. 
1. Introduction 
It is not uncommon, at the end of an introductory seminar on Relevance Theory 
(henceforth, RT), for members of the audience to ask questions aboutthe potential of the 
theory as a means of explaining literary communication or, for short, Literature (not less!). 
Usually, this sort of question makes the lecturer wince and may cause hirn to turn nasty. 
Small wonder that when the lecturer answers the question (which, being a conscientious 
academic, is the right thing to do) the person asking the question is left without a satisfactory 
explanation.' 
The problem is that we seldom fhink of fheories as parts of integrated world views. After 
all, theories are devices to solve scientific problems of specific domains, and as such, RT 
purports to handle questions on communicative aspects of human interaction from a 
cognitive point of view.2 It is all very well to use that theory as a means to clarify linguistic 
(and pragmatic) problems which have been poorly understood in the past and can now be 
solved in easy and elegant ways; I am sure that this is what its creators had in mind when 
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they set out on their brilliant task, and the papers in the present volume are clear proof of 
that effort. However it is perhaps more difficult to handle all the variables that define a 
complex phenomenon such as "literature" by concentrating only in the cognitive and 
communicative aspects that RT so clearly describe.3 
My purpose in this case is to try and give my own integrated view on the important, but 
not exclusive place RT has in understanding a complex phenomenon like the one we cali 
Literature. In order to do that, I wül have to set what for me is a convenient stage, arrange 
the lights in order to illuminate the issues I believe to be important, and give what I consider 
to be the crucial factors their role in the play as I experience it. It is my contention that if al) 
goes well, people who are interested in such questions as I mentioned above -that is to say, 
philosophers, rather than linguists- might well be given an indication of how RT integrates 
in the scientific thinking opened by cognitive research in fields that seemed intractable until 
now. 
2. The evolutionary stages of human thought. A Science-fiction story 
Since I am preparing a play for you, it will not matter very much, will it, if I use some ideas 
that are not totally flawless but which can help us to set the stage in an easy and 
understandable way? As Sperber (1984, 1990) often asserts, even (partially) wrong or 
unclear notions can help us to expand knowledge and arrive at coherent and correct world 
views. The ideas I am going to use and adapt to my present purpose are from Horton 
(1982).4 
It is perhaps not unreasonable to see living beings as information processing devices, 
that is to say, animáis in general need to have some meaos of interacting with their 
environment in order to survive.5 First let us assume that human beings are animáis which 
belong to the highest step of the evolutionary ladder -I hope this assumption will not give 
rise to disagreement! Now I want to tell the (science-fiction) story of the evolution of the 
human information processing device from the moment when it was more or less similar to 
that of the superior animáis to its present and unique human state. 
It seems a fact that the first information processing device developed by humans looked 
no different from that of other superior animáis. As inputs it used the potentially observable 
objects of the world, and applied some easy inferencing rules of the type, ifX, then F(where 
Xand Fcan be any of a number of objects) to give outputs which in turn helped survival and 
propagation. For instance, 
[f every time [if 1 come cióse to a lion, then the lion tries to eat me up] then 1 had better 
not come cióse to it -or if I do, I had better have something with which to defend myself. 
The limits of this way of processing are "specific" -we cannot process reality as a fly or 
as an elephant. 
The next step in evolutionary history was Man's (and woman's) ability to use objects 
created in the mind as inputs, that is to say, fhings not necessarily observable by the senses. 
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This gave us human beings an immense power of prediction, for the rules applied to those 
invented objects were still of the same inferencing type as the one above. For example, 
If every time [if there is a tempest at sea, then our boat may capsize [if my boat capsizes, 
then I drown]] then I pray to Neptune [if everything has a creator, then tempests at sea 
have a creator whose ñame is Neptune] so that he saves me from drowning. 
Notice that there are many unwarranted assertions here (e.g. why is the creator of the 
tempest's ñame Neptune?) that we possibly don't share. We did share, though, all the 
hypotheses appearing in the first type of information processing; that is precisely why I said 
that the limits of that first type of processing were specific. The limite of the information 
processing that we are now looking at, however, are not specific (otherwise you would 
share them!). Letus say they are social -or cultural, if you prefer. If one shares them, one 
belongs to the "in" group; if not, one is an outsider, or, even worse, a wicked apostate. 
Either way one might as well be destroyed as a dangerous heretic -remember Galileo? 
The last step in our processing device is the one adopted very recently. The input might 
be still constituted by objects invented in our minds, but the inferencing rules must use only 
observable (material) facts. This is a very difficult requirement to follow, but since the 
processing device is chosen individually, it is the individual who sets its limits in a conscious 
way. I will not give examples of these operations now, for the paper is really concerned with 
the workings of such a system trying to arrive at an invented unobservable notion we have 
named Literature. 
Before proceeding any further, let me point out that the first way of processing is as oíd, 
if not older than our species, and can therefore never be obviated. The second one is very 
oíd too and well established in our mind. It is very difficult not to assert unwarranted 
cultural acquired notions if we know that a large body of human beings share them. Some 
of them might appear to be simple facts,6 that is to say their limit seems "specific" and not 
"cultural." This last way of processing, however, is a very difficult one to follow and a 
concerted effort must be made not to fall into the other two very natural7 ways. We may now 
agree that those three ways of processing information are what we commonly term, ways 
ofthinking. The first one corresponds roughly with what we know as common sense, the 
second could be called traditional thought, and the last one, scientific thinking. 
As we all know, there are consciously established limits that constrain scientific thinking 
in a strict way. Let me point to two sets of requirements. The first set was designed by 
Noam Chomsky in his first papéis on linguistics in the early sixties and the second is David 
Marr's requisites which appeared in his papers on visual perception, in the late eighties. 
Chomsky asks scientific researchers to reach at least a first level of adequacy in their 
thinking: they must know what object or phenomenon they are observing. This is the level 
of observational adequacy. Then, they must try to describe the object or phenomenon being 
observed, and if this is managed, they will have reached the level of descriptive adequacy. 
Real scientific thought is not achieved unless this level of explanatory adequacy is reached: 
the level where one is able to describe the operations in a materialist causal way, which is, 
as I explained before, what scientific thinking is all about. However, this last level is so 
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difficult to reach, that we need a new set of levéis in order to clarify what the process is 
about. 
Marr expects the cognitive researcher to be able to establish three sublevéis in this 
explanatory state of the scientific theory.8 First of all, one must be able to establish the 
computational description of the phenomenon, stating what its inputs normally are, and 
what operations are to be applied in order to obtain the desired outputs. The first level is the 
most general one. In the next level, one tries to ñnd out what kind of representations are 
current in the realization of those operations described in the first level - this is a cultural 
level of analysis. The last level, the implementation level, is the effort to understand how 
the general computations of the first level, and the representational level are implemented 
in the world. Let me give you an example from Hutchins (1997). Suppose that your object 
of research is human navigation. The computational level would describe the necessary 
operations one has to effect from the state of not knowing where one is (the input), to the 
state of knowing the position one has and the direction one has to follow (the output). At the 
representational level, it is clear that western representations on navigation are not the same 
today as the ones present before the compass was invented. The fundamental questions are 
the same, but the way each culture solves them is different. The implementational level 
would be the level where one would analyse those implements (from the compass to the 
charts) which somehow embody the representations of a special culture. 
My Catch 22 question is: could one think about literature in a similar constrained way 
to that which Chomsky and Marr consider to be scientific? 
3. The problem of representations 
The cognitivist framework operates on two basic notions: representations and 
computations. In any cognitive system (a human mind, a computer, or whatever) some sort 
of representational input is transfonned into a representational output by the workings of 
certain sets of operations which have to be described algorithmically. This is what 
constitutes the computations of the system. Let us now first look at the notion of 
representation. 
The problem is that we do not have a clear idea of what a representation really is; what 
we do have is an intuitive hunch: to re-present, at least in its etymological sense, seems to 
point to a new presentation of something, perhaps in some other form and/or médium. If I 
meet a new colleague and she makes some kind of impression on me, I represent her to 
myself in order to approach or avoid her, whatever the urge may be. It is clear, however, 
that this intuitive notion does not embrace what I would like to cali, perhaps inappropriately 
(see below), abstract representations such as, say, patriotism, marriage, literature, etc. 
There are more sophisticated definitions, of course. Riviére (1986) argües that 
representations are micro-states of the brain (i.e., physical structures of neurons) which get 
translated phenomenologically (i.e., present themselves to our consciousness) as 
psychological states with some kind of mental structure. It may well be that these mental 
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stxuctures have the biological purpose (a) to finish the process of abstraction begun by the 
perceptíve organs and their operations, and (b) to créate objects (and relations between 
them) so as to predict future action. With the last part of this description, we at least have 
a hook to hang such abstract representations as I mentioned before -those that were never 
present in the world before being re-presented in our minds. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) say that representations are (structures of) hypotheses about 
the world we entertain in our minds. This also includes the possibility of representing 
abstract objects that don't exist outside. 
Fair enough, but... is that enough? 
Maybe we should also try to understand what these representations really mean -their 
content and what their shape and form might be. As for their content, Papineau (1987) 
believes that there are two main types: the content of representations that form beliefs, and 
the content of representations that constitute desires: 
The biological function of any given belief type is to be present when a certain condition 
obtains: that then is the belief truth condition. And, correspondingly, the biological 
function of any given desire type is to give raise to a certain result: that result is the 
desire's satisfaction condition. (p.64). 
It is understood that beliefs and desires are two different types of representations. This 
distinction, then, is one of content: truth conditions for beliefs, future satisfaction conditions 
for desires.9 
Now, as far as the form of representations is concerned, Riviére (1986) believes that we 
can distinguish two basic forms: 
(1) Representations whose components have the same, or similar, structural relations 
to those of the real world {e.g., the my friend's face has the same components, in somehow 
the same relationship inside my mind, as in her real face). He calis these analogical 
representations, intrinsical, since relationships do not have to be explicitly expressed. 
Obviously examples are images of any kind, not just visual ones. 
(2) Representations where these relationships have to be explicitly shown, that is to say, 
extrinsic. These representations which are what we generally cali "propositions." For 
instance, if you try to representmy friend's face in a proposition you will have to state if her 
eyes are low or high in relation to some other component, if her nose is deviant or not, and 
so on. As far as I know, abstract representation (e.g. love, history, creativity, greatness etc) 
are not so much abstract as only propositional. 
There is a further distinction that has to do with the scope of the representations. Sperber 
(1984) suggests that there are representations which belong to individual minds, and are 
therefore prívate representations, whereas those representations that are shared by two or 
many more minds (/. e., a whole culture), are public representations. Communication is the 
process by which human beings convert a certain set of prívate representations into public 
representations by means of certain computations. Of course, public representations have 
to be translated into prívate representations in the heads of the participants, something that 
is almost never completely achieved. Take for instance, the representation of Literature. 
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People that belong to our culture agree roughly on some kind of representation with a given 
content and a propositional form {Le., "Literature is this and that, etc."). But do we all share 
the hypothesis that belong to our prívate representation of literature? I suppose this is a very 
difficult question to answer, but my guess is that we don't, otherwise there would not be 
different opinions on what literature really amounts to.10 
4. How do we "observe" representations? 
For cognitivists, then, representations are the only units worth studying scientifically. As 
our aim here is to try and decide if Literature can be dealt precisely in that way, we will 
have to characterize it in representational terms. 
Literature belongs to thatmacrofield of thinking that we loosely ñame humanities. Now, 
cognitivists would argüe that the kinds of representations humanists are normally concerned 
with are: 
(1) What human behaviours represent. For example, talking, playing, cooking, 
hunting, etc. 
(2) What the result of these behaviours represent. For example, a book, a dish, a 
building, etc. 
(3) What the way in which some of those results are viewed represent. For 
example, a poem, a birthday cake, a special uniform, etc. 
Notice that all these representations have in principie the dual status prívate and/or 
public. 
You may have a certain representation of the behaviour that you consider writing has, 
as opposed, say, to the behaviour that you consider painting, or scribbling has; a book, as 
opposed, say, to an article or to a picture; or a poem, as opposed, say, to a landscape or a 
narrative. And you may believe that this representation of yours is, as a whole, publicly held 
by some other people. 
Humanists, however, tend to forget the prívate character of these representations and 
assume without further ado that their own "prívate" representations are "pubüc" without any 
relevant11 difference between the two. They then proceed, as if that object {Le., the public 
representation), was something real, and begin building (stractures of) hypotheses upon it, 
some with great ingenuity and sophistication. Ultimately, humanists end up with theories 
on concepts that are not even clearly (not to say causally and materially) defíned. It is as if 
someone starts with an internal representation of some personal experience, and then 
pretends that (s)he has a scientific point of view of it because (s)he is able to build up a 
marvellous (structure oí) hypothesis on its constituent parts, its fimctioning etc. This is what 
the so-called scientific structural approach to human behaviour (anthropological, linguistic, 
etc.) has splendidly done this century, creating a vast amount of theories that can hardly be 
disproved since they do not rest on any solid ground. The only way to oppose one of those 
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very clever theories is to créate another with even more ingenuity and sophistication. But 
none represents an explanation of any real problem existing outside our own minds.n They 
are indeed hanging on thin air -and that is to say a lot! Dennett (1995) calis these 
representations skyhooks. You hang a word with a vague prívate meaning of your own from 
one of those hooks and then you construct a beautiful theory to hang from it ... an 
insubstantial impossibility since, as we all know, nothing cannot hang from the sky. So, 
where does such a theory get us in the end? Of course, these skyhooks also exist outside the 
structuralist world -but their creators at least do not enthusiastically pretend to be scientific; 
theirs is a different pretensión, boasting instead of belonging to the world of human 
creativity and greatness. 
The moral of my story is that we nave to come down to earth and abandon skyhooks if 
we really want to think scientifically about such matters; that is to say, we nave to be very 
careful when choosing our objects of study and should frnd out what their exact nature is. 
Moreover, we have to be aware that certain representations are so prívate in nature, that 
even when they become public, they never lose their prívate character. When, for instance, 
we think that X resembles Y, it is because we privately process for our own benefit some 
aspects of X that we think match, in a certain way, some aspects of Y. It would be 
astonishing though, would it not, if somebody tried to study resemblance in general. So, 
when I come across similar academic papers on "humanistic" topics, I am filled with a 
strange feeling - a strong sense that they are wasting their time and... ours, too! 
Now, if Chomsky is right,13 and I think he is, another very difficult topic to study 
scientifically is "behaviour." Nobody would want, I suppose, to indulge in the construction 
of a learned framework on the behaviour of my dog eating all sorts of rubbish in the street 
and refusing the dog food I so kindly leave for its dinner. What a zoologist might probably 
want to know, however, is what might the causes for that type of behaviour be -not the 
actual behaviour by itself. In other words, as scientists we are interested in material causes 
of phenomena; and since the objects hanging from skyhooks have no known causes 
(material or otherwise), they are not objects for scientific thinking. The only point of some 
of the longer-surviving sky-hanging objects in our culture (or any other), is that they offer 
us a (possible) goal we might want to analyze in causal terms; they may prove useful in 
offering new insights and, especially, an explicatory ladder going from the very simple 
material causes to the notion that has remained unexplained until now. 
We will concéntrate now on the object Literature hanging from a well established 
skyhook in our cultural background. What is Literature"] We might agree from the very 
beginning that literature is some sort of discourse. Now, discourse is the behaviour human 
beings effect in their communicative efforts among themselves. RT is the cognitivist 
account on how the causes of such a behaviour could be described and explained. Clearly 
in a volume, such as this one, specifically dedicated to solve communicative and linguistic 
problems by means RT, it seems clearly unnecessary and superfluous to even hint at an 
explanation of how RT works. However, while running the risk of stating the obvious, let 
us just rernind ourselves that human discourse is the behaviour that comes about when 
human beings ostensively want to make manifest in different degrees a certain set of 
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assumptions. We may flirther remember that the degree of manifestness is sometimes the 
cause oípoetic effects.14 This is all that can be extracted from the theory in this aspect. It is 
understood that poetic effects alone do not give rise to literature or to a literary discourse. 
One thing we have to be clear about is that in this respect there is almost no distinction 
between "normal" and "literary" discourse. 
We will have to make an effort and try to characterize Literature in a more precise 
manner. Since it seems thatmost cultures distinguish between two kinds of discourse,15 and 
if this distinction is notto be explained crucially by the poetic effects human communication 
sometimes achieves for all sorts of reasons, there must be something more. To make things 
easy, we can begin our search hanging Literature from another skyhook, namely Art. And 
startanew trying to figure out what this object really (i.e. casually) is. So, having accepted 
that Literature is an act of human communication causing a behaviour we cali discourse, let 
us now try to understand something about what we mean when we characterise this 
discourse as being artistic. 
5. What are we "observing" when we talk about Art! 
This is indeed a tough question. Some believe that when one talks about Art one is thinking 
of the objects that make up the inventory of some worldwidely accepted human creativity: 
pictures, Sculptores, books, photographs, films, musical scores etc. For them, therefore, 
Art is in the objects themselves. Others prefer to think about human creativity in general and 
concéntrate on what artists try to do when they paint, write, or dance. For these people art 
is in the action of the artists. There are even others who beüeve that Art is in the "eye of the 
beholder," in the reception of the messages artists produce. For them, Art is in the action 
of the interpreter(s). We may also beüeve that art is both, action from the part of the artist 
and the receptor, and the object that embodies the artistic message, and fhen try to study the 
"object" art as a mixture of activity and result of that activity.If> Let me propose a different 
approach. 
Suppose we characterize Art as an attitude. An attitude is previous to action and, 
obviously, to the results of that action. Good so far, but you may well ask: What is an 
attitude? Psychologists have difficulties in defining what a human attitude really amounts 
too; let me then simplify the problem by accepting the very clear notion of attitude defined 
by Sperber and Wilson (1986). For them, an attitude is a way of processing information. 
No more and no less. In human communication, the participants are aware that there are 
different ways of processing the same propositional forms in order to get the message 
straight. If I say a simple sentence like / will come tomorrow, my attitude, which has to be 
deduced (by elements in the situation, my tone of voice or whatever), may be interpreted 
as a threat or as a promise; or if I assert that Tony has always been a very clever guy, you 
may notice that I say it with an ironic or even sarcastic intention. There are, of course, ways 
to make these attitudes explicit in human communication by embedding propositions in so-
called performative propositions, or, to be more exact, high order propositions. What 
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interests us, is that we do not process the informatíon in the proposilions expressed in the 
same way, if we assume there are different attitudes in the utterances. 
For all I know, Art (and one of its manifestations, Literature) is the processing of 
information in a special way which will have to be described. Even a WC basin can become 
art if we adopt a certain attitude with respect to the information we can extract from it in 
special circumstances, as modern artists well know. 
5.1. How do we "describe" Arft 
I will assume that you are going along with me in my thinking and accept, at least in 
principie, that Art is an attitude or, in cognitive terms, a way of processing. Now let me try 
the second movement and describe this way of processing, albeit in a pardal intuitive way. 
Sperber and Wilson characterize human communication as a process whereby new 
information is put in contact with oíd information stored in our minds in order to produce 
the desired effects. These desired effects, then, depend on the relevance the new 
information shows for us in a given moment. 
My question is: how does a new born baby find relevant information when it does not 
have any other information in its mind? One can argüe, I think quite rightly,17 that there is 
innate information stored in the minds of new born babies which could then act in the way 
Sperber and Wilson suggest. But it might be slightly different if we believe that part of this 
information stored from birth, operates in such a way that the first information which comes 
from the outside gets imprinted in the mind, creating what Fodor (1983) calis a module -i. e., 
a device to process information in a certain fixed way (language might be such a module). 
Sperber (1994) has a different story for modules which neatly fit my idea. For him, modules 
are not only imprinted or ofherwise fixed at the beginning of human life; he thinks human 
minds do not stop creating modules during the whole of their existence. 
We could perhaps say in an impressionistic manner that the creation of those modules 
is in fiíct the building up of what we know as human personality. The fixing of some way 
of processing the information that comes from the outside, be it from the sounds of a human 
language or of any other type of information, does indeed characterize us in many important 
aspects. 
My claim is that, in some special cases, humans are not only programmed from birth 
to develop processing modules, but can adopt an attitude which fecilitates the building up 
of such devices. We have all heard of the long practices that some "religious" movements 
establish in order to reach illumination of some kind or other. In our culture, for instance, 
lack of sleep and food together with long prayers, which through repetition and repetition 
loóse their communicative effect, achieve states of mind where the information stored in the 
brains, or at least some of it, is not recovered so as to process the new information that 
keeps coming in. If you go on long enough, so some claim, you might all of a sudden "see 
the light" -the information coming from the outer world in a new and brilliant (?) way. In 
the Japanese Zen culture, the blocking of the normal pace of information processing using 
stored information to interact with the new is achieved by the koans -meaningless sentences 
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which the Master constantly repeats for his pupils' benefit. There are other means in other 
cultures, as we all know. The important common thread is that they all try to stop using oíd 
information in order to process new incoming infonnation in a relevant way. The mystics 
assert that this way of seeing reality is the only real way. As the Zen dictum says: 
When you start your way of Zen, the mountain is a mountain. When you go along the 
way, the mountain ceases to be a mountain. But when you arrive at the satori 
(illumination), the mountain IS the mountain. 
Now, I do think that the deep sense of the attitude that I want to describe as Art is 
precisely a manner of processing information which has a lot to do with the mystic attitude. 
In former papers181 pointed out that the notion of Art as being subjective, could be explained 
in fhese terms: the subject experiences reality directly, without using any model (or object) 
prefabricated to handle or understand reality -which is what scientific thinking tries to 
achieve by being objective. 
As Sperber and Wilson explain, attitudes can be inferred by using all sorts of Índices; 
but they can also be decoded from the high order propositions which sometimes explicitly 
embed linguistic messages. The attitude I nave described as the true embodiment of the 
notion of art can also be inferred or decoded as the case might be. We nave all sorts of 
índices that allow us to process some type of information in the "subjective" manner, some 
of which are so strongly manifest that they approach the decoding process.19 For instance, 
if we see a broom hanging from a wall in a museum, we have a very manifest indication that 
it is to be treated as art, and not as a tool abandoned by the cleaning staff. 
At this point of my description, there may be many who oppose strongly to the idea of 
art as a mystical attitude and experience -and they are probably right, for this attitude cannot 
be the whole story. Indeed, for most of us Art, is an experience that needs a lot of cultural 
background in order to be appreciated in a convenient way. So, where does the idea of not 
using stored representations go? I will certainly have to develop this idea further to reach 
a more general account of what the artistic attitude really is. 
5.2. How do we "describe" artistic communication? 
I beüeve that the essential description of Art is the one I have just outlined, but we are born 
in a society of human beings which communicates constantly for all sorts of differing 
reasons, and as I said before that Literature is a kind of communication, but what kind of 
communication? 
I will adapt some of the ideas of Pratt (1977) to the present framework. According to 
her, the gist of artistic (and literary) communication can also be defmed as a human attitude, 
or, alternatively, as a way of processing information. We may process information in a 
direct way, trying to créate and/or get the message that is more or less explicit in the means 
(linguistic or otherwise) we use. But we may also have a high order attitude with which we 
valué this message in some way. That is, in Pratt's words, we can display the message in 
order to watch it as a representation worth considering. If this is so, artistic communication 
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in general, and literary communication in particular, have a ftirther component of great 
importance: the social valué a given culture bestows on some of these displays which Pratt 
is talking about. 
6. Where to look for scientific "explanations": 
As this is perhaps not a very extended representation, let me try to recapitúlate what I 
described so far. It is my contention úiatArt (and Literature) can be defined as a complex 
of two basic human attitudes and the description of these attitudes must account for the 
following facte: (i) that one of them permits us to try to perceive reality in a direct way, with 
as little interfering schemes of stored hypothesis as possible. As this attitude is what gives 
art its subjective character, I will cali it subjectivizing attitude. (ii) that the other attitude is 
the one that allows us to display information wholes in order to judge them in some 
individually and/or socially estabüshed manner. This is what makes art a communicative 
phenomenon. We will cali it displaying attitude for obvious reasons. What we now need is 
an explanation of why human beings have the possibility of processing information in such 
a peculiar20 way and, also, when and how they use it. 
I have no biological explanation for the subjectivizing attitude, but I can loosely advance 
a working social hypothesis by pointing to the fact that, apart from new born babies, the 
processing of information with the mínimum interaction with stored information seems to 
occur automatically in certain moments of human Ufe. Another such moment could be when 
the individual finds a mate. Everything is "logically" against this mating, but there you are, 
it's love at first sight. One can do nothing about it! I hope that the shallowness and banality 
of this explanation does not obscure the real possibility of pointing to a socio-biological 
function for this way of processing. In other moments of great emotion (fear, anguish, 
delight etc) this way of processing incoming information seems to function as well and 
"form" the personality of the individual who went through it. One may hear, for example, 
that so-and-so changed since he carne back from the War. Among other explanations, the 
subjective contact with the information provided by the world in such special circumstances 
may be worth investigating further. If it proves to be right, we will then have a real 
explanation of the effects Art sometimes produces. 
The displaying attitude is easier to trace biologically (and socially! Cfr. note 22). As 
Pratt claims, it enhances the social network, enabling people to share feelings of solidarity 
-an important cohesive factor for our social species. It therefore has a clear selective valué. 
Of course, the representations people want to share and valué form part of the three systems 
I have tried to describe above: species-specific, social and individual. It seems that species-
specific possibilities are arousal-raising and arousal-moderating devices, such as those 
pointed out by Berlyne (1971: 254): 
The arousal-raising capacity (...) depends mainly on information content, complexity, 
number of subunits and details, and richness of ornamentación. (...) Similarly, arousal 
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moderation depends in large measure on redundancy, of which there is a great deal 
whenever (...) importance is attached to symmetrical or otherwise restrictive structure. 
The social possibilities depend on acquired patterns in cultural evolution. Sorae 
societies, like our modern Western one, may valué innovation, others, the repetition of 
explicit cultural structures, as apparently the ancient Egyptians did, and others, like the 
people in the Renaissance, strive to recover the cultural patterns of ancient cultures. There 
are also cultural áreas that are fashionable in one culture and forgotten in others, etc. 
It is of course very difficult to point to individual interests in general. The previously 
mentioned Berlyne tries a classification of what for me is of dubious valué, but which may 
interest statistically-minded researchers (Cfr. Berlyne (1971: 255-265)). 
I do hope I nave been able to convey the idea that a real possibility does exist of reaching 
the three levéis of adequacy in theorizing scientifically over propositional representations 
such as Art and Literature. Let me attempt to end this essay by characterizing the manner 
in which we might treat this topic in a scientifically cognitive way. 
7. The computational level of analysis 
According to Simón (1981:153), "solving a problem simply means to make the solution 
transparent." If we now want to solve the computational problem that Art and Literature set 
for us, we must first represent a notion of computation extended enough to comprehend 
operations happening inside the heads of people and those that may be found in the social 
system itself - what we normally cali, culture. This idea is from Hutchins (1996), for whom, 
"Computation |may] be taken, in a broad sense, to refer to the propagation of 
representational state across representational media" (p. 118). 
In studying Art and Literature then, we are interested in the patterns of certain elements 
which can be interpreted as representations in a given médium; in the way such 
representations go from one médium to the other. Now, what can these patterns be? 
The answer, for the moment, can only be a very intuitive one. It could go like this: 
On the one hand, human beings are part of a physical and social environment. Physical 
environment is perceived and represented by the processes we outlined at the begrnning of 
this paper, that is to say, human beings learn to deal with the physical world by creating 
mental representations of its relevant aspects. Social environment, however, is not as 
obvious to perception as physical elements are. Human beings are of course sensitive to 
some social interactions from almost as soon as they are aware of the physical shapes and 
laws that govern the physical world. For instance, they immediately learn that their mother 
is the helping social partner vital to their needs.21 In any case, even a social relation has to 
be mentally represented in some manner in order to be of any help for the individual. Let 
us suppose that these representations (the physical as well as some social ones) are stored 
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directly as factual representations.22 They would form the gist of what I called primary 
thinking (or common sense) above. 
On the other hand, as we also mentioned before, human beings developed the íaculty 
of embedding representations into other representations, thus creating an immense quantity 
of mental elements which became the proper objects of secondary thought. What can the 
evolutionary benefits of this extended mode of processing information be? At fírst glance, 
dealing with real aspects of the world in an appropriate way is clearly an asset for survival, 
but dealing with imaginary representations which do not exist out there in the actually 
perceived world seems to be a hindrance rather than a help to survival. With all those 
dangerous creatures trying to destroy us or with all that (material and spiritual) food waiting 
for us, it seems such a waste to start imagining non-existent objects which keep us busy 
instead of running away from foes or grasping edible fruits of all sorts. Perhaps a good 
answer to the problem of the selective valué of secondary thought lies in the following idea: 
Tt deals (almost from the child' s first talk...) with the stuff of human action and human 
intentionality. It mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more 
idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires and hopes. It renders the exceptional 
comprehensible and keeps the uncanny at bay -save as the uncanny is needed as a trope. 
It reiterates the norms of the society without being didactic. And... it provides a basis for 
rhetoric without confrontad on. It can even teach, conserve memory, or alter the past 
(Bruner, 1990:52). 
Imagination, in general, serves this social assimilation process by adapting individuáis 
to their material and social world in a smooth way, eliminating potentially destructive 
processes of illadaptation. And precisely because the individual is intimately aware (most 
of the time) that the products of his imagination are not factual information, (s)he uses a 
different means of processing them -displaying them so (s)he can watch and eventually 
judge if they are in any way useful or not. Naturally, all this is hardly a conscious 
procedure. What the individual does seem to feel is a certain "peace of mind" that may help 
to accept difficult material and social constraints. 
It is likely that in cases where these constraints are felt by a whole human group the 
imagination of one of its member may serve as a "peace maker" too, if it can be properly 
communicated. And if the other members of the group come to valué this narrative and 
accept it as displayed information for their benefít, it may even become an idiosyncratic 
product which slowly turns into a "tradition" for that group. It is in that sense, I believe, that 
the last part of Bruner's quotation above is to be understood. 
The patterns interpreted as representations in a given mind could probably be 
distinguished in the following terms: 
A) On the one hand, the unproblematic representations. Namely those that belong 
to what we could loosely cali the contení of the representations, keeping in mind that 
there seem to be two types of these representations: the facts and actions of an external 
world (real or imagined), and the mental events in the mind of the protagonista).23 
These two types can appear together, for instance, in the narrative, where the important 
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element in a narrated imaginary world is the way the protagonist(s) interpret the world. 
Sometimes, however, the weight of one of these types of representations outbalances 
the other type as, for instance, in lyrical poetry. 
B) On the other hand, the problematic representations. Those that belong to the 
evaluation world of the participants. I cali them problematic because, as I said before, 
in cognitive theory there is a tendency to consider that representations belong only to 
the first group, while the second group consists really of procedures which indicate the 
way one should opérate with representations. I am not sure if procedures would be 
considered representations in all instances,24 but I conceive them as somehow ingrained 
in human minds -just as representations are. These evaluative representations would 
frame the content representations in such a way that the whole message might be 
considered as displayed and, thus, prepared to be socially valued. 
As was said above, a computational analysis has to account for the way such 
representations go from one médium to the other; how prívate representations made up from 
perceptions of the world and of prívate representations that interpret these representations 
become public representations, and are therefore capable of turning into prívate 
representations yet again in the minds of the people that perceive and interpret them. If we 
agree that this computational process is what we cali human communication, it seems clear 
that RT might well be a device for analysing its operations in an explicit and coherent way. 
However, there seems to be more to it than just human communication. For one thing, 
public representations constrain, not only the content, but also the form of the likely 
material concerned in these operations. Let me quote Bruner again: 
...The language of skilful narrative differs from that of skilful exposition in its 
employment of "subjectivizing transformations." These are lexical and grammatical 
usages that highlight subjective states, attenuating circumstances, alternative possibilities 
{id., 53) 
We should investígate if this idea is correct, and if more constraints like these are to be 
found and may be explicitly described as cultural (or perhaps even as biological) processes. 
This field of research is one of the ways I see to expand our knowledge of what literature 
really is. Especially, if those "subjectivizing transformations" and other similar devices are 
evaluating representations which trigger the displaying mode of processing information. But 
there is still another field closely related to this, namely, the one that traces the passage of 
representations from a given médium, say, the prívate mental one, to another, say, the 
public cultural one, and vice versa. A very interesting starting point for this analysis is Dan 
Sperber's sketch of a theory which he calis the epidemiology of representations (Sperber, 
1984, 1990, 1994) or the contagión of ideas (Sperber, 1996) which can be summed up here 
with his own words: 
An epidemiology of representations is a study of the casual chains in which [the] mental 
and public representations are involved: the construction or retrieval of mental 
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representatíons may cause individuáis to modify their physical environment, for instance 
to produce a public representation. These modifications of the environment may cause 
other individuáis to construct mental representatíons of their own; these new 
representatíons may be stored and later retrieved, and, in turn, cause the individuáis who 
hold them to modify the environment, and so on.2S 
8. The representational level of analysis 
At this level, one should find out what sorts of attitudes, beliefs, behaviours and actions are 
considered by different societies to embody the computational processes I have tried to 
outline above. For instance, there are societies where these processes are not managed in 
written media and constitute what some very aptly cali oraliture.26 In those oral cultures, 
the representatíons of these processes, which may include the social instances in which they 
are enacted, the accepted ways of "artistic" creatíon, and even the sort of valué they favour 
most, seemto be significantly different from those of a literary society luce ours. Consider, 
for instance, the oral marks that indícate in Wolof culture that a "special" discourse (Le., a 
tale) is starting and so, inevitably, the people concerned are requested to adopt the 
displaying way of producing and perceiving its information. 
Je conté 
Nous t'écoutons 
II était une fois 
Cela est arrivé 
Quand c'est arrivé étais-tu présent? 
Parle je t'écoute27 
In oral cultures, the displaying attitude goes further than in literate societies. There is 
first the rhythm to mark the passage from one communicative situation to another and to 
help in opening up the ways of processing information in this way. But rhythm itself has 
some kind of content valué which can also be displayed and valued. From this point of view, 
Senghor (1964) has this to say: 
Qu'est-ce le rythme? C'est l'architecture de l'étre, le dynamisme interne qui lui donne 
forme, le systeme d'ondes qu'il émet á l'adresse des Autres, l'expression puré de la Forcé 
Vítale. Le rythme c'est le choc vibratoire, la forcé qui, á travers le sens, nous saisit á la 
racine de l'étre. II s'exprime par les moyens les plus matériels, les plus sensuels: lignes, 
surfaces, couleurs, volumes en architecture, scuplture et peinture; accents en poésie et 
musique; mouvements dans la danse. Mais ce faisant, il ordonne tout ce concret vers la 
lumiére de l'esprit. (pp. 211-212). 
Senghor is definitely not an üliterate person; therefore, this passage is full of literary 
images we are, more or less, used to reading in our type of society. But it is not clear to me 
132 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
wether it is possible to understand fully the real meaning of the passage unless one has had 
the privilege of hearing and seeing Senghor himself speaking parís of his own literary 
production. It is only then that one understands some particularly obscure expressions of 
this text like the last one: "[le rythme] ordonne tout ce concret vers la lumiére de l'esprit." 
I can assure you, rhythm does just that when Senghor is performing! 
Rhythm, however, is not the only difference. The symbolic nature of oral languages is 
also very concrete and, therefore, able to be displayed as well. Let us read Senghor once 
again: 
L'oeuvred'artnégreexprime, par nature, une ideé ou sentiment-image: un symbole. (...) 
L'image nait de la forcé de suggestion du signe employé: du signifiant. Car l'image ici 
n'estpas une image-équation, mais ine image-analogie, oú le mot suggére beaucoup plus 
qu'il ne dit. Le tour de forcé est d'autant plus aisé que les langues africaines sont des 
langues concretes, dont tous les mots, par leur racines sont chargés d'un sens concret 
émotif. Au-delá du sigifiant, il faut toujours voire le signifié.28 
I do think that this sort of metaphoric text can only give us an intuitive notion of the 
representations that are culturally disseminated in some oral cultures; we cannot pretend to 
achieve more in this paper. 
On the other hand, it does not seem the place here to give an exhaustive account of the 
current representations that exist in our cultural environment; it is a topic for an extended 
paper in its own right. However, it may be worthwhile to try a sketchy outline of what 
constraints we are subjected to by our own representational world in this domain, and thus 
come to realize that some attitudes, activities and what have you, that seem perhaps to be 
quite "natural" for us, are really cultural representations which differ from those we 
considered above in substantial ways. 
I will summarize here what Pratt (1977) understood as "preparatory conditions" in the 
typical speech act theory trend she favoured. From our present cognitive point of view, they 
can be re-interpreted as representations we all have when we face the literary phenomenon. 
She starts by quoting Ohman (1971), who said that 
... our readiness to discover and dwell on the implicit meaning in works of literature -and 
to judge them important- is a consequence of our knowing them to be literary works 
(p.H6), 
and then proceeds to describe the representations that build up this knowledge: 
First of all, we have the representation that the text was composed in writing and that 
it is definitive. This representation is composed by a structure of the following sub-
representations: the writer had time to plan and prepare his utterance and to correct it; 
therefore, we assume that the textis free from gross randomness -it is a satisfactory versión. 
This representation is also formed by another subset of representations: we believe that the 
text will be worthwhile and because of it, we accept that it may be longer and more difficult 
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to decipher. We also have the representation that the work passed through a process of 
selection (publishers, editors, critics, reviewers, etc.). 
Like the masters of ceremonies, these literary judgers ratify the speaker on our behalf and 
request our attention on his behalf, with the obvious difference that the role of master of 
ceremonies is mainly symbolic, while that of editors, publishers and critics is very real 
indeed(p.H9). 
This last representation gives us some confidence as to the social valué ascribed to a 
given piece of written discourse. That is to say, we not only hope for the fulfilment of our 
expectancies, but we also implicitly accept the classification of the work we read given by 
those selection devices our culture provides. This is what I think Traugott (1976) had in 
mind when she stated that the notion of genres and subgenres was a set of appropriate 
conditions. The extent of our knowledge on these matters depends of course on our learning 
the social coordinates that govern a cultural background. I can imagine that the general 
representations (novéis, theatre, poems, etc.) are quite well disseminated in our own 
cultural tradition, whereas some more refined classifications depend on a more specific 
learning which not every member of our society is able to achieve. 
Summing up, one can say that we have the social representation of a speech situation in 
which the speaker has an unique access to the floor, but we know that this access is not free. 
He must make it worthwhile for us. And here lies the reason for displaying the text in one 
way or another so that we can valué it and accept our momentary relinquishing of the floor. 
9. The implementational level of analysis 
This level is difficult to circumscribe for the following reason: in literature, the material 
implements, Le., the written texts, or even the books themselves, are not considered literary 
components of the artistic phenomenon. It would be very strange if someone insisted on 
including the description of the material aspects of a text (font, length, colour, etc.) or of 
the object we cali book, (covers, pages, weight, etc.) in a literary research paper . Yet, there 
is much to say about the role that printing and editing have in the representation of literature 
in our culture. I do not know if my own prívate representations of literature can be 
generalized; for me at least, this representation includes, as one of its constituent parts, 
images of well furnished libraries, handsome volumes, and cheap pocket editions awaiting 
to be admired and used by eager readers and other book lovers. I have deliberately made 
a distinction between the "admiration" that books produce, and the "use" we make of them. 
I said above, though, that in reading literature we process the information so that we may 
admire or otherwise valué the messages we interpret. In this, I see a cióse relationship with 
the admiration that books, as physical objects, often produce. Very seldom is a book, in the 
material sense of the term, an artistic object by itself. The admiration we feel in front of a 
library mil of books might come from our representation of the thousands of possibilities 
the books have in them to make us appreciate and valué what others have either created or 
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appreciated and valued before us.29 In cognitive science there is, however, a well 
entrenched belief in concentrating research almost exclusively on the analysis of 
computational structure, with little attention being paid to the description of the media where 
this structure is implemented.30 This might be a bad habit, as Hutchins, for one, thinks:. 
What is the implementational level for the (...) system as a whole is the computational 
level for the people who opérate the tools of the system. The material means in which the 
computation is actually performed are implementational details for the system, but they 
set the task constraints on the performance (...). (Id., 51).. 
10. Concluding remarks. 
In this paper I have attempted to offer an integrated view of the cognitive approach to the 
cultural concept of literature. As you may have noticed, very little (if anything!) is 
revolutionary or even new in the representational structure that forms my own picture of the 
world. What is new, and I think very interesting, is the way we may look at these concepts 
from now on. There seems to be a possibility of starting from below and perhaps reaching 
the skyhooks from which these concepts have been hanging until now. As Sperber (1992) 
believes,. 
[Les sciences cognitives] ne se sontpas developpées autour d'une découverte empirique; 
elles n'ont d'ailleurs pas á ce jour engendré de découverte majeure. Elles ne se sont pas 
non plus developpées autour d'une nouvelle méthode; leur méthode est éclectique, et la 
seule nouveauté importante qu'elle comporte -l'utilisation de simulations sur ordinateur-
est loin d'étre un usage general dans le domaine. Non, le point de départ et le pivot des 
sciences cognitives, c'est une réponse nouvelle au vieux probléme des rapports entre 
l'ame et le corps (p.400). (My italics).. 
It is true that RT in this context is sufficientíy coherent and explicit to begin to analyze 
some of the communicative aspects of this cultural phenomenon with a fair degree of 
success. These aspects of art, however, still need much work before we can créate a 
workable theory which, according to my present point of view, could well go in some of the 
directions I have only outlined here. 
Notes. 
1. Clearly, 1 am saying all this somewhat tongue in cheek. However it is interesting to note 
in this respect that one of the authors of the theory, frequently annoyed by such questions, 
complains that the theory often interests "the wrong kind of people." 
2. The full ritle of the book where RT is deployed is Relévame: Communication & Cognition 
3. This does not mean that I believe that "literature" is not a communicative phenomenon that 
has some cognitive consequences. On the contrary, and as such, RT is immensely useful as a 
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means to explore some of its effects. What I am saying is that if one is able to intégrate this RT 
explanation in a wider world view, we might achieve a better all-round visión of the whole 
phenomenon. 
4. As far as I know, their flaws have been pointed out by Boyer (1990). In any case, I'm not 
talking here of the distinction between the so-called primitive and modern minds, which is a 
surprising side-effect of the current notion in cognitive studies that attributes cognition only to 
human minds and not to global socio-cultural systems {Cfr., Hutchins, 1996:354). What I am 
trying to do here is merely to give a sketch of a (likely?) evolutionary history of human minds. 
5. There are thousands of papers, articles, books, etc. stating similar ideas. A very 
interesting one is Dennett (1995) 
6. Sperber & Wilson (1986) speak of these factual assumptions as stored directly in human 
minds (as, for instance P), and oppose them to other ways of storing assumptions (for instance: 
I believe that P, or P is true, etc). 
7. In order to be exact, perhaps one should say, very natural and very cultural. 
8. Although it does not correspond strictly to this level, as one can easily infer from the 
description of the requirements 
9. However, I am not altogether happy with the definition of meaning as a set of truth 
conditions, for I don't think that this comparison covers the whole notion; but since this is not 
a paper on the meaning of meaning, we will not pursue the question further. Of course, the same 
misgivings haunt me in the case of desires, although it might be a good start to pretend we accept 
this description without doubts. In this I follow Sperber's idea that incomplete representations 
help one to build world views and extend knowledge. (See above, p.2). 
10. It may be objected that there are representations of literature that seem to be more 
extended than others. For instance, the idea that literature is to be found in texts is a very popular 
one; as a consequence, the author of the text is therefore considered the creator of (a work of) 
literature. We will try to characterize the dissemination of some representations across a given 
social tissue and see if we can establish relationships between individual minds and socially 
distributed systems of representations. 
11. This for some levéis is absolutely true. The problem is when inadvertently one assumes 
that certain (structure of) hypothesis are manifest for everybody and one uses this as a basic 
element in the construction of a theory. 
12. Sperber (1996) humorously shows that, from a structuralist point of view, one could 
argüe that Hamlet and Red Riding Hood have exactly opposite deep structures! 
13. Cfr., Chomsky (1992) 
14. Cfr., Sperber & Wilson (1986) and, notably, Pilkington (1992) 
15. Certain African oral cultures, for instance, distinguish between the "angular word" and 
the "round word." The angular word, they claim is the one that hurts if it hits you -what we 
would cali in our culture the "normal" (?!) discourse; the "round word" however, having no sharp 
edges, can never hurt you -we would cali it poetic, or literary discourse. Cfr. Calame-Griaule 
(1965, 1970). Note that in both cultures, there is a sharp distinction in the types of objects that 
we now cali discourse in our culture or words in those African societies; this could naturally 
mean, that this distinction had a natural cause we must discover. 
16. See note 11 
17. Cfr., Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby (1992) -not to mention Chomsky in almost all of his 
work. 
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18. Guijarro (1984, 1993) 
19. It is very diffícult for me to decide at what point a certain element that can become a 
candidate to be considered a premise in an inferencing process turns into a coded element that 
triggers an immediate response. For example: the first time I turned off the ignition of my newly 
acquired car and it started to whistle a traditional cowboy song, I had to make all sorts of 
inferencing processes in order to know what the whistling was about. It took me at least a minute 
to do the right sort of reasoning. Now, as soon as I hear the whistle, I know I have left the lights 
on, and I automatically turn them off. It has become a coded signal for me! Hutchins (1996:237-
8) says something that could be of interest in this aspect: 
Meanings seem to be in the messages only when the structures with which the message 
must be brought into coordination are already reliably in place and taken for granted. 
The illusion of meaning in the message is a hard-won social and cultural 
accomplishment. (My italics). 
20. I say peculiar because I am not aware that any other living organism uses its mental 
powers to direct information processing in that way. 
21. In fact, some researchers, believe that "Any higher mental function (...) was social at 
some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function. It was first a social relation 
between two people" (Vygotsky, quoted in Hutchins (¿72:283)) 
22. Cfr., Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 
23. Cfr. Bruner, id.: 51 
24. See Deirdre Wilson's miméographed class notes on Semantic Theory, for instance 
25. Sperber, 1984: p.77 
26. Cfr., Díaz-Plaja, 1984: 29 
27. Kesteloot, Liliane & M'Body (1983) 
28. Quoted by Adiaffí (1983), p.20 
29. Pratt makes a very interesting remark in this respect. She acknowledges the fact that 
books bear with them at least the message that another person, on top of the author, considered 
the book worth it. This makes it different from orators in street corners and writers of side-walk 
poetry. They have to win their audience by themselves, while in institutíonalized literature as it 
is implemented in books, this is done by a host of other people who as I said above, considered 
it important enough to have published, reviewed and sold in book shops. As she says: "an 
utterance which does not pass trough this process (whether because it was not submitted or 
because it was rejected) is not a work of literature" (p. 120-1) 
30. We have heard thousands of times that what is important is the program, not the types 
of machines that can run it. 
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